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What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo?
The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review the Supreme
Court's Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud
Litigation
Patrick J. Coughlin, Eric Alan Isaacson, and Joseph D. Daley*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 2005, the United States Supreme Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo' ruled on the issue of loss causation in
private actions for open-market securities fraud prosecuted under
Securities Exchange Act § 10(b).2 The issue in Dura was a narrow one:
whether a complaint only alleging price inflation due to a material
misrepresentation or omission sufficiently pleads loss causation.
Reversing a Ninth Circuit holding that an inflated purchase price by
itself sufficiently establishes loss causation,3 the Supreme Court ruled
that defrauded investors must instead plead and then prove that a
misrepresentation proximately caused an economic loss.4  The Court
held that to state a claim, plaintiffs' pleadings must provide defendants
with fair notice of plaintiffs' claim of loss?
A case can be made that the Supreme Court should have endorsed the
Ninth Circuit's longstanding rule that loss causation is adequately
pleaded with nothing more than allegations that false representations-
disseminated in the open market-injured investors when they paid too
6
much for a security, by purchasing it at an artificially inflated price.
* The authors are partners in the law firm of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins
LLP who represented the plaintiffs before the Supreme Court in Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125
S. Ct. 1627 (2005). Mr. Coughlin argued the case on January 12, 2005.
1. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
3. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd 125 S. Ct. 1627
(2005).
4. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1633.
5. Id. at 1634.
6. See, e.g., Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that "[I]n
a fraud-on-the-market case plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on
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But whether or not the Court adopted the best possible rule is, for
practitioners, largely beside the point. For good or ill, its decision is
law. This article, accordingly, focuses not on what the Supreme Court
perhaps ought to have done, but on what it in fact did and the
consequences for investors.
The Court resolved an apparent conflict among the circuits by setting
down a uniform rule of law. To do this, it chose among a variety of
positions. And, although it ruled against the plaintiffs, and overturned
established Ninth Circuit precedent, it by no means adopted a position
that may fairly be portrayed as hostile to investors--quite to the
contrary. As set forth below, the Supreme Court did not adopt
draconian rules calculated to make recovery unreasonably difficult.
Rather, it adopted sensible rules for pleading and proving loss causation
in securities cases that should not prove overly burdensome to investors.
Part II of this article lays the groundwork for the Dura decision by
reviewing the element of loss causation and the pleading requirements
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA). 7 Next, Part HI examines what Dura does-and does not-
hold, in particular examining the various positions taken by Dura
Pharmaceuticals and its amici that the Court declined to adopt.' This
Part also explores the various ways loss causation can be alleged in the
absence of a stock price decline following a corrective disclosure. 9 In
addition, this article explores several arguments advanced by Dura
amici and Professor John Coffee, a well-regarded securities-law
the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation."). Powerful arguments have
been framed in favor of the Ninth Circuit's approach. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying
Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 Bus. LAW. 507 (2005) ("Because of this
fundamental difference in causal connection, the twin concepts of transaction causation and loss
causation simply do not make sense in fraud-on-the-market actions."); Michael J. Kaufman, Loss
Causation Revisited, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 357, 359-69 (2004) (discussing the elements of liability
under Rule 10b-5). See also MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES §§ 11-4
to 11-8 (2004) [hereinafter KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION] (discussing loss causation in
Rule lOb-5); Michael J. Kaufman, Loss Causation: Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law
Jurisprudence, 24 IND. L. REV. 357, 365-86 (1991) [hereinafter Kaufman, Exposing a Fraud]
(arguing that Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs should not be required to prove loss causation); Andrew L.
Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy
to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV. 469, 471-94 (1988) (explaining the development of loss causation
in the context of remedies available to plaintiffs in securities-fraud cases).
7. See infra Part H1 (defining loss causation, describing its origins in case law, and reviewing
the pleading standards under the PSLRA).
8. See infra Part Il (describing the claims and defenses of the parties in Dura, the Court's
holding, and the arguments rejected by the Court).
9. See infra Part IH.C.3 (describing the various ways loss causation can be alleged in the
absence of a stock price decline following a corrective disclosure).
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academic, that were not adopted in the Supreme Court's holding.' °
Ultimately, this article demonstrates that those various arguments rest
upon faulty premises.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Loss Causation Origins in Case Law
Judge Posner has written that "what securities lawyers call 'loss
causation' is the standard common law fraud rule ... merely borrowed
for use in federal securities fraud cases."" And for two centuries the
common law has followed the rule, articulated in Pasley v. Freeman,
that an action for "deceit lies when a man does any deceit to the damage
of another."' 2 Thus, in cases of fraud, if "no injury is occasioned by the
lie, it is not actionable: but if it be attended with a damage, it then
becomes the subject of an action."' 3 The Supreme Court's opinion in
Dura represents, from one perspective, only the most recent in a very
long line of cases applying this rule, that one demanding relief for fraud
must draw some connection between the deceit alleged and the injury
claimed. 
14
The Court had addressed the necessary connection between
misrepresentation and loss a century before, in cases dealing with
common-law fraud and market manipulation. In Sigafus v. Porter,'5 it
said that where investors contend fraud induced them to purchase
securities, the recoverable loss amounted to "the difference between the
real value of the stock at the time of the sale and the fictitious value at
which the buyer was induced to purchase."' 6 Ruling in McMullen v.
Hoffman 17 that an anticompetitive bid-rigging contract is against public
policy, the Court noted that an English case once addressed a plot "by
false rumors to raise the price of the public funds and securities," which
is conduct that "strikes at the price of a vendible commodity in the
market, and if it gives it a fictitious price by means of false rumors, it is
10. See infra Part IV (exploring the future of securities proof and pleadings after Dura).
11. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted)
(emphasis removed); accord, e.g., Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 1997) (noting that § 10(b) "loss causation" is "nothing more than the 'standard common
law fraud rule').
12. Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450,457 (K.B. 1789).
13. Id.
14. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (quoting Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. at
457).
15. 179 U.S. 116, 122-26 (1900).
16. Id. at 124 (quoting High v. Beret, 148 Pa. 261, 264 (1892) (internal quotations omitted)).
17. 174 U.S. 639 (1899).
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a fraud leveled against all the public, for it is against all such as may
possibly have anything to do with the funds on that particular day."'8
When Congress codified an express private cause of action for
market manipulation in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), the
statutory text was "framed specifically in favor of any person who shall
purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by [a
prohibited] act or transaction."' 9 And when federal courts recognized an
implied cause of action under § 10(b), a companion provision outlawing
any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" proscribed by
Securities and Exchange Commission rule,2° they developed, through
decisional law, the elements of liability for § 10(b) claims.2'
Some thought the rule for securities-fraud claims in general was
clear: "In an action based upon fraud the purchaser is entitled to recover
his actual loss measured by the difference between the price he paid and
the value of that which he received, determined as of the time of the
transaction.,,22  And in federal securities-fraud cases, courts often
deemed the loss "recoverable by one who through fraud or
misrepresentation has been induced to purchase bonds or corporate
stock [to encompass] ... the difference between the contract price, or
the price paid, and the real or actual value at the date of the sale. 2 3
When the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,24
18. Id. at 649 (quoting Rex v. De Berenger, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (1814) (internal quotations
omitted)). The relevant loss appeared to be payment of an inflated price: "'The means used are
wrong, they are false rumors; the object is wrong, it was to give a false value to a commodity in
the public market, which was injurious to those who had to purchase."' United States v. Brown,
5 F. Supp. 81, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (quoting De Berenger, 105 Eng. Rep. at 540 (Dampier, J.)),
affd, 79 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1935)).
19. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 46 (1977) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000)
(emphasis removed)). Congress thus "focused in § 9 upon the amount actually paid by an
investor for stock that had been the subject of manipulative activity," making the investor's
recoverable loss the "improper premium" at which the stock traded, over the price at which it
would have traded absent the manipulative misconduct. Id. See also Rosenberg v. Hano, 121
F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1941) (stating that to recover under § 9(e) an investor "must either have
entered a false market or paid a false price to enter a genuine market"); Kaufman, Exposing a
Fraud, supra note 6, at 367-68 (noting § 9(e)'s inflated-price rule).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
21. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (enumerating "various positive
and common-law requirements for a violation of § 10(b) or of Rule 1Ob-5...."); Dura Pharm., Inc.
v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1627-33 (2005) (establishing the elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim).
22. Kaufman v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 366 F.2d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1966).
23. Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533
(10th Cir. 1962); see KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 6, §§ 11-4 to 11-8
(discussing loss causation in Rule lOb-5); Kaufman, Exposing a Fraud, supra note 6, at 358
(noting cases that have developed the use of loss causation); Merritt, supra note 6, at 471-92
(discussing the connection between loss causation and remedies).
24. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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dealt with claims that owners of securities had been fraudulently
induced to sell them for less than their worth, the Supreme Court ruled
that materiality of concealed information established the "requisite
element of causation in fact," and the investors could recover under §
10(b) "the difference between the fair value the [plaintiff] received and
the value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent
conduct. '25 And in Randall v. Loftsgaarden,6 the Court observed that
the precedents "have also generally applied this 'out of pocket' measure
of damages in § 10(b) cases involving fraud by a seller of securities. 27
The Ninth Circuit concluded that in fraud-on-the-market cases, where
investors contend the price for a security was manipulated by false and
misleading statements and omissions, inducing them to enter
transactions for the securities at an artificial and fraudulent market
price, loss might consist simply in paying an inflated price-with no
further showing required. Liability in such cases, the Ninth Circuit
observed in Blackie v. Barrack,28 is predicated "on a showing of
economic damage (loss causation)," and reliance or "transactional
causation," which might be inferred from the fact that reasonable
investors would not choose to incur a loss by buying manipulated
stock.29  In his concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.,30 Judge Sneed opined that the difference between the price paid
for an artificially inflated security, and the value received, is the loss
"proximately caused by the misrepresentations of the defendant[,]" and
''measures precisely the extent to which the purchaser has been required
25. Id. at 154-55. The Supreme Court subsequently explained:
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), which involved
violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by a buyer of securities, this Court held that
ordinarily "the correct measure of damages under § 28... is the difference between
the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would
have received had there been no fraudulent conduct."
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986).
26. 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
27. Id. at 661-62.
28. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 906. The court explained:
We think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context
by proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, without direct proof
of reliance. Materiality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders
and hence the inflation of the stock price when the purchase is made the causational
chain between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs loss is sufficiently established to
make out a prima facie case.
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. Thus, the required "causal nexus can be adequately established
indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not
ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock." Id. at 908.
30. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976) (Snead, J., concurring).
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to invest a greater amount than otherwise would have been necessary."3
And in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner observed that in securities
cases, the term "loss causation" generally refers to the "loss produced
by a discrepancy between the actual market value of a stock and what
the value would have been had there been no misrepresentation[.] 32
Yet the securities-fraud precedents have never focused exclusively on
inflation at the time of purchase-nor could they, as investors have
often pointed to a post-purchase decline in value as the loss they wish to
recover. In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,3 3 when investors
claimed they were induced by fraud to purchase a stock that later
became worthless, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the "causation
requirement is satisfied in a Rule lOb-5 case only if the
misrepresentation touches upon the reasons for the investment's decline
in value. 34 The court also said that if the investors proved their case,
they could recover "the difference between the price paid and the 'real'
value of the security, i.e., the fair market value absent the
misrepresentations at the time of the initial purchase," which it
identified as "the loss proximately caused by the defendants' deceit. 35
Investors who claimed a post-purchase decline in price demonstrated
their loss would, however, have to show that the fraud at least
"touch[ed] upon" the reasons for the decline.36
The Ninth Circuit applied Huddleston in some cases-barring
recovery where investors pointed to a decline in a security's value to
show their loss, but provided no link between the misstatements or
omissions alleged and the subsequent decline in market value.37 In
31. Id. at 1344 (Sneed, J., concurring); see also Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431,
1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's jury instruction that loss causation could be
found if the material misrepresentations or omissions caused the market price of the stock
purchased to "be higher than it would have been if all the true facts were known....").
32. Isquith v. Caremark Int'l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.). Judge
Easterbrook similarly observed, in Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 1992),
that damages under § 10(b)
usually are the difference between the price of the stock and its value on the date of the
transaction if the full truth were known .... Sometimes this principle comes under the
name "loss causation": the plaintiff must establish that the misstatement caused him to
incur the loss of which he complains; it is not enough to establish that the
misrepresentation caused him to buy or sell the securities.
Pommer, 961 F.2d at 628 (citations omitted).
33. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
34. Id. at 549.
35. Id. at 554-55.
36. Id. at 549.
37. See, e.g., McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting and
following Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 547-49); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting and following McGonigle and Huddleston).
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other cases, however, the Ninth Circuit insisted that paying an inflated
price by itself was enough to make out a loss-without regard to
subsequent events."
Other courts demanded more than a simple showing of inflation at
the time of purchase. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, acknowledged
that "[s]ome courts have held that 'in a fraud-on-the-market case,
plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on
the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation[,]'" 3 9
but construed Huddleston as requiring investors to give "proof of a
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the investment's
subsequent decline in value."4 The Third Circuit interpreted its own
precedents as holding that "where the claimed loss involves the
purchase of a security at a price that is inflated due to an alleged
misrepresentation, there is a sufficient causal nexus between the loss
and the alleged misrepresentation to satisfy the loss causation
requirement[,J" but added that the decisions "assume that the artificial
inflation was actually 'lost' due to the alleged fraud., 41 "In the absence
of a correction in the market price," the court explained, "the cost of the
alleged misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of the
security and may be recovered at any time simply by reselling the
security at the inflated price. 42 The inflation would have to come out of
the security's price for investors to show a meaningful loSS. 43  The
Second Circuit similarly concluded that "allegation of a purchase-time
value disparity, standing alone, cannot satisfy the loss causation
pleading requirement," emphasizing that the investors before the court
satisfactorily "alleged that their investment ultimately became worthless
because of the company's liquidity crisis and expressly attributed that
crisis to the executive's inability to manage the company's finances"-
problems sufficiently related to the alleged deficiencies of the
defendants' disclosures. 44 A security's decline in value on realization of
38. E.g., Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In a fraud-on-the-
market case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of
purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.").
39. Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Knapp,
90 F.3d at 1438).
40. Id. (citing Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549).
41. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2000).
42. Id. (citing Judge Sneed's concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541
F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976), as "stating that an investor's proximate losses are limited to
those amounts that are attributable to the unrecovered inflation in the purchase price").
43. Id.
44. Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir.
2003).
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a fraudulently concealed risk, it observed, easily satisfies theS 41
requirement of showing loss causation.
B. Pleading Standards under the PSLRA
Generally speaking, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for a
liberal standard of notice pleading-allowing plaintiffs to proceed with
their claims if they provide the defendants with fair notice of the nature
of their case.46 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires the
"circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity," demands something more than simple notice pleading;
but its scope is limited, and its application to securities cases gave rise
to conflicting standards that Congress sought to resolve when it enacted
the PSLRA, adding § 21D to the Securities Exchange Act.47
Subsections (b)(1) and (2) of § 21D set forth uniform and stringent
standards for pleading securities-fraud claims-requiring investors both
to specify in their complaints just what was misleading and the reasons
why,48 and to plead facts raising "a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind" whenever scienter is an element
of liability.49  These provisions were designed to resolve conflicts
45. Id. (noting as satisfactory "a causal connection between the concealed information-i.e.,
the executive's history-and the ultimate failure of the venture").
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief'); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("No technical forms of pleading or
motions are required."); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002) (applying
liberal notice pleading standards); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993) (reaffirming its notice pleading standard as
explained in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974) (stating that it "is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss... for failure to
state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the
pleader"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating "the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim").
47. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995). The PSLRA enacted sweeping changes to the rules governing federal securities actions,
of which the new § 21D was but a small part.
48. Section 21D(b)(1) provides:
Misleading Statements and Omissions.-In any private action arising under this
chapter in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant -
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason
or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (2000).
49. Section 21D(b)(2) provides:
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among the circuits and to strengthen the pleading standards for pleading
fraud in federal securities-fraud cases-ensuring that investors can
identify false or misleading statements and facts raising a strong
inference of scienter to lodge allegations of fraud.5" These provisions
do not, by their terms, address the pleading standard required to
establish the element of loss causation. However, loss causation is
addressed in a later provision, subsection (b)(4), which provides that if a
complaint survives the hurdles raised by the PSLRA's pleading
requirements, 5' the plaintiffs will ultimately be required to prove loss
causation. 52  Therefore, since subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) impose
heightened pleading standards only for pleading falsity and scienter, and
subsection (b)(4) addresses loss causation only after the heightened
Required State of Mind.- In any private action arising under this chapter in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
50. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740 (noting that "the courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b)'s requirements in conflicting
ways, creating distinctly different standards among the circuits," and citing "testimony on the
need to establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements"); see also William S. Lerach
& Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 941-42 (1996) (noting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's call on
Congress to resolve a split among the circuits in pleading scienter).
51. Section (b)(3) provides for dismissal of complaints that do not meet the preceding
pleading requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2000).
52. The statute states:
Loss Causation.- In any private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall
have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate
this title caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). Ironically, the provision's legislative history strongly suggests
that Congress sought to codify something like the Ninth Circuit rule that loss consists of paying
an inflated price for a security. The Senate Report characterized the provision as one "codifying
the requirement under current law that plaintiffs prove that the loss in the value of their stock was
caused by the § 10(b) violation and not by other factors," explaining that it
[riequires the plaintiff to show that the misstatement or [omission] alleged in the
complaint caused the loss incurred by the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff would
have to prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artificially
inflated as a result of the misstatement or omission.
S. REP. No. 104-98 at 7, 15 (1994), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679. The Statement of the
Managers accompanying the Conference Report explained that the new legislation
[r]equires the plaintiff to plead and then to prove that the misstatement or omission
alleged in the complaint actually caused the loss incurred by the plaintiff in new §
21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act. For example, the plaintiff would have to prove that the
price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artificially inflated as the result of the
misstatement or omission.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
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pleading standards have been cleared,53 it is a fair inference that the
section leaves loss causation subject to ordinary notice-pleading
standards.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DURA DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Dura arose as a securities class action filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California, on behalf of
investors who purchased Dura Pharmaceuticals securities between April
15, 1997, and February 24, 1998 (Class Period), against Dura
Corporation itself and several of its top officers (collectively "Dura").54
The plaintiff investors alleged that Dura made misleading statements
to securities analysts and investors on two subjects: (1) sales of Dura's
"Ceclor CD" antibiotic product, and (2) the status of its new "Albuterol
Spiros" (AlSpiros) device for delivering Albuterol asthma medicine.
Defendants' misstatements, the plaintiff investors contended, inflated
the price of Dura securities through the Class Period (and after), causing
them to overpay when they purchased those securities. 56 Their Second
Amended Complaint detailed how Dura falsely represented that Ceclor
CD antibiotic sales were increasing-when in truth, Dura knew they
were dropping.57
The plaintiffs also claimed that Dura falsely represented that
completed tests showed its new AlSpiros drug-delivery system,
designed to aerosolize a powdered form of the asthma drug Albuterol so
that it could be inhaled easily, was effective and poised for Food &
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2000).
54. J.A. at 34a, et seq., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-932); see
J.A. at 59a-60a (showing lead plaintiffs' individual purchases), J.A. at 60a-63a (listing
defendants); J.A. at 138a-39a (stating class allegations).
55. J.A., supra note 54, at 34a-58a.
56. J.A., supra note 54, at 55a, 58a, 139a.
57. J.A., supra note 54, at 48a-52a. Specifically, Ceclor CD sales began to drop around
March and April 1997 (from 47,288 units in March to 39,808 in May), and ultimately dropped
nearly 50% by midsummer (24,797 units in July). J.A., supra note 54, at 70a-71a. As Ceclor
CD sales collapsed, Dura publicly asserted that they were strong, falsely reporting increased
market share by comparing Ceclor CD, not to the entire class of respiratory antibiotics, but to
generic Ceclor products. J.A., supra note 54, at 49a. By late 1997, the investors asserted, Dura's
channels were jammed with many months of unsold inventory, versus the normal one-month
supply. J.A., supra note 54, at 50a, 1 10a. In December of 1997 Dura began to offer a 5% price
reduction to wholesalers, trying to get them to take even more. J.A., supra note 54, at 49a-50a.
Not until early 1998 did Dura belatedly admit to the drop-off in Ceclor CD sales, the clogged
sales channels, and the need to hire hundreds of additional sales personnel to move the product
and salvage Ceclor CD sales. J.A., supra note 54, at 51a, 109a-10a.
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Drug Administration (FDA) approval. 8 In truth, the investors said,
clinical trials and in-house testing had shown that the device was fatally
flawed-it rarely worked properly.5 9  Dura's top engineers
recommended that Dura not proceed with scheduled Phase III clinical
trials, let alone file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA, until
the known reliability and stability problems were resolved. 60 But Dura's
top executives ignored their warnings. 6' During its clinical trials
AlSpiros experienced a failure rate exceeding 30%, versus an industry
target of less than 1%.62
Dura nonetheless told the investing public that it was successfully
executing on its AlSpiros drug-delivery technology, and was pleased
with the results.63  This, the plaintiff investors insisted, was false.
Even following the disastrous Phase III clinical trials-in which the
product had to be modified several times-Dura never managed to
solve the product's stability problems and eventually had to abandon
65AlSpiros.
Why the alleged misrepresentations? Dura's original business
66
strategy had been to sell niche-market pharmaceutical drugs. By 1995,
seeing that it would be increasingly difficult to sustain revenue and
earnings-per-share (EPS) growth solely by securing rights to market
niche drugs, management decided to change course.6 7 Dura would
become a medical-device company, developing and marketing its own
proprietary products.68 Because this metamorphosis would cost millions
of dollars-and to avoid a huge negative impact on its reported
earnings-Dura's management created Spiros Development Corp.
(Spiros I) in December 1995, to incur Dura's costs of developing the
58. J.A., supra note 54, at 35a, 76a-78a.
59. J.A., supra note 54, at 37a-43a, 45a-47a, 51a-53a.
60. J.A., supra note 54, at 37a-38a; 40a.
61. J.A., supra note 54, at 40a, 74a. In October 1996, Dura's Vice President of Product
Development, Robert Eisele, authored an internal report (the "Eisele List") examining and
explaining the existing problems with the AlSpiros product. AISpiros, the report noted, was
incapable of consistently delivering the required drug dosage or of withstanding normal use
conditions, and its cassette system suffered from instability. J.A., supra note 54, at 37a-39a.
These problems persisted throughout the Phase III final clinical trials despite several
modifications, producing a 30% overall failure rate during the trials. J.A., supra note 54, at 39a-
43a.
62. J.A., supra note 54, at 40a-41a, 73a.
63. J.A., supra note 54, at 45a, 66a-67a.
64. J.A., supra note 54, at 72a-74a.
65. J.A., supra note 54, at 41a-43a, 53a.
66. J.A., supra note 54, at 34a-35a.
67. J.A., supra note 54, at 34a-35a
68. J.A., supra note 54, at 34a-35a.
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Spiros drug-delivery system.69
By the spring of 1997 the securities market clearly understood that
A1Spiros was critical to Dura's future.70  Without AlSpiros, said
securities analysts, Dura would be "strictly" a specialty-drug marketing
company, limited to selling "niche respiratory product lines.'
AlSpiros was what "differentiates Dura," because it would "provide an
important growth catalyst" and add an anticipated $58 million to Dura's
sales in 1999, and then $100 million in 2000.72
So, starting in April 1997 through December 1997 defendants began
to crow about Ceclor CD sales and AlSpiros-stating that Ceclor CD
sales were strong and gaining market share, and that A1Spiros was a
"durable" product that worked and was efficacious. 73  As a
consequence, Dura's stock rose from $27-7/8 in April to $44-7/8 share
by mid-July 1997. 74 Taking advantage of the inflated price, Dura on
July 25, 1997, accomplished a $287.5 million convertible-note
offering-its largest securities offering ever.75 At the same time, Dura
insiders unloaded nearly 190,000 of their own common-stock shares for
$7 million in proceeds.76
Throughout the fall of 1997, Dura trumpeted Ceclor CD sales, and
stated that AlSpiros development was on track for commercial sales
beginning in 1998.77 As a consequence, Dura's stock price climbed still
further, to $52-1/4 on October 8, 1997-an all-time high. 7' Two days
later, Dura announced it was going to exercise its option to buy Spiros
I's stock using Dura stock, and would launch a successor company-
Spiros I-via a sale of units to the public that would include warrants
to buy the high-flying Dura stock.79 Within a few days, on October 14,
1997, Dura reported record earnings attributing ostensibly strong
pharmaceutical-sales growth to several factors, including excellent
Ceclor CD sales.80 With Dura's stock price high, individual defendants
69. J.A., supra note 54, at 36a, 44a.
70. J.A., supra note 54, at 76a-78a.
71. J.A., supra note 54, at 76a-77a.
72. J.A., supra note 54, at 76a-78a.
73. J.A., supra note 54, at 65a-67a.
74. J.A., supra note 54, at 45a, 67a, 81a.
75. J.A., supra note 54, at 92a. Two lead plaintiffs purchased 65 of those notes, at over
$1,000 apiece. J.A., supra note 54, at 60a.
76. J.A., supra note 54, at 120a-22a.
77. J.A., supra note 54, at 92a-96a, 10la-03a.
78. J.A., supra note 54, at 94a.
79. J.A., supra note 54, at 94a.
80. J.A., supra note 54, at 95a-96a.
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again sold personal stock holdings, collecting another $9.2 million."s
And on December 17, 1997, Dura and Spiros II successfully completed
the Spiros II offering, selling 5.5 million Spiros II units (at $16 each) for
$88 million.82
On February 24, 1998, within weeks of the offerings and insiders'
sales, Dura shocked investors by admitting that Ceclor CD sales were
far weaker than previously represented, and that trying to boost sales
would require expanding its sales force by 66%, at great expense.83
Dura's stock price dropped 47% in a day, from a high of $39-1/8 on
February 24 to a low of $20-3/4 on February 25, on an unprecedented
32-million share trading volume. 84 The stock tumbled another 40% in
the ensuing months.85
In early November 1998, in a press release that misleadingly
downplayed the ruling's significance, Dura revealed that the FDA had
rejected its AlSpiros NDA.86  Although Dura's stock dropped another
20%, then recovered,87 the investors-who were proceeding under
Ninth Circuit law-made no effort to tie this, or any other decline in
price, to disclosures concerning AISpiros. When the FDA issued a
"notice of violation" to Dura three days later, charging that the
company's press release itself had "misleadingly minimize[d] the fact
that Dura must conduct a completely new clinical data [study]," Dura
quietly removed the misleading press release from its website.88
Notably, the FDA denied Dura's application for the very reasons that
an internal Dura document (the Eisele List) had catalogued before the
Class Period in October 1996, showing that the device was neither
reliable nor stable.89  These were the very reasons for which Dura's
81. J.A., supra note 54, at 105a, 120a-22a. Former FDA employee Prettyman, head of Dura's
Regulatory Affairs Department, argued against submitting the AISpiros NDA to the FDA, but
when overruled he sold 15,000 shares at $48-1/2 for over $728,000 on November 5-just five
days before his department filed it. J.A., supra note 54, at 103a, 105a.
82. J.A., supra note 54, at 103a.
83. J.A., supra note 54, at 51a, 109a-Oa.
84. J.A., supra note 54, at 51a.
85. See J.A., supra note 54, at 1 l0a, 54a (showing stock chart); "Dura Warns On Profit,
Teams Up With Lilly On Insulin," Bloomberg News, Sept. 23, 1998 (reporting on Dura's
activities).
86. J.A.,supra note 54, at 110a-Ila.
87. See J.A., supra note 54, at 156a (charting Dura's closing price and trade volumes).
88. J.A., supra note 54, at L Ila; Letter From Joan Hankin, Regulatory Review Officer for the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to Katherine Hefferman, Senior Manager of the Regulatory
Affairs Department at Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nov. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/nov987258.pdf.
89. J.A.,supra note 54, at 110a-Ila.
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engineers had advised management not to proceed.90 Those defects
were allegedly so severe that Dura ultimately abandoned its attempts to
develop the AlSpiros system-it was never proved to be reliable or
efficacious .91
Investors who had purchased Dura securities at inflated prices filed
suit on January 27, 1999, alleging securities fraud and proposing a Class
Period that closed with Dura's first negative revelation centering on
Ceclor CD and that, as noted, made little effort to tie Dura's
dramatically declining stock price, to investors' evaluation of the
AlSpiros device. Following amendments the district court dismissed
plaintiffs' Second Consolidated Amended Complaint with prejudice and
entered judgment, holding that plaintiffs had not pleaded facts raising a
strong inference of scienter regarding false statements about Ceclor
CD. 92 The court further held that because Dura had not mentioned the
AlSpiros device in the press release about poor Ceclor CD sales, on
which Dura stock dropped 47% at the Class Period's close, plaintiffs
had not sufficiently pleaded that false statements about AlSpiros had
caused them any loss, despite further declines in Dura's stock price.9'
Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court had erred in ruling
that they could neither plead scienter as to statements about Ceclor CD
sales, nor loss causation as to the false AlSpiros statements, and the
Ninth Circuit reversed.94 As to Ceclor CD, the Ninth Circuit found that
the district court had erred in considering the allegations separately
rather than as a whole. It directed the district court to consider
allegations about Ceclor CD's market share, strength of sales, channel
stuffing, and insider sales, as well as any additional allegations from
confidential witnesses about manipulating analysts and a defendant's
oft-stated phrase "let 'em catch us," in conjunction with one another to
evaluate whether plaintiffs had pleaded facts raising a strong inference
of scienter.95 As to AlSpiros, the Ninth Circuit followed decades of
precedent to hold that loss causation does not in every case require "a
disclosure and subsequent drop in the market price of the stock...
because the injury occurs at the time of the transaction. '96 "It is at this
90. J.A., supra note 54, at 37a-39a, 40a, 74a.
91. J.A., supra note 54, at 53a, I lIa.
92. Pet. for a Writ of Cert., App. at 45a-47a, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627
(2005) (No. 03-932).
93. Pet. for a Writ of Cert., App., supra note 92, at 34a-40a.
94. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
95. Id. at 939-41.
96. Id. at 938.
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time that damages are to be measured." 97 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
could find no reason to limit any amendment to the Ceclor CD
allegations.98
B. Holding
A careful reading of the Supreme Court's Dura decision reveals that
the opinion consists of two main sections that deal with matters of
"proof' and "pleading" respectively.99 This Section examines each in
turn.1°
1. Dura's Proof Requirements
The first section of the opinion deals with what securities-fraud
plaintiffs ultimately must prove in order to establish loss causation,
concluding "that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
misrepresentation (or other fraudulent conduct) proximately caused the
plaintiffs economic loss. ' 1O While this proof may take a variety of
forms, the Supreme Court declined to define either its substantive or
temporal parameters with much precision. Instead, the Court held that
plaintiffs may prove they suffered economic loss as the "relevant truth
beg[an] to leak out" or as "the truth ma[de] its way into the market
place.'
0 2
In so holding, the Supreme Court declined Dura Pharmaceuticals'
request for a rule that would have required a plaintiff to show that a
stock drop was directly tied to a corrective disclosure in order to
recover. °3 Instead, the Court seemed to recognize that fraud-induced
inflation could be removed in any number of ways in addition to a
corrective disclosure.1°4 According to the Solicitor General, inflation
97. Id.
98. Id. at 941.
99. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631, 1634 (2005).
100. See infra Part lII.B.1-2 (discussing what plaintiffs must prove in securities-fraud cases to
establish loss causation and providing guidance regarding pleading requirements).
101. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1629.
102. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
103. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Dura's position on pleading requirements).
104. Transcript of Record at 38-39, Dura, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (No. 03-932) [hereinafter
Transcript]. Justice Breyer, at oral argument, noted that inflation might come out in many
different ways, not simply an announcement "I'm a liar." Id. According to Justice Breyer,
inflation could "ooze out as earning reports come in, but it has to come out." Id. Even the
Solicitor General recognized "fraud can be revealed by means other than a corrective disclosure
and a drop in the stock price may not be a necessary condition for establishing loss causation in
every fraud-on-the-market case." Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 19, Dura, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (No. 03-932) [hereinafter U.S. Brief]. The Supreme
Court nowhere requires there be a corrective disclosure tied to a stock drop; instead, the Court
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attributable to a misrepresentation might be reduced or eliminated even
if there were a net increase in price., 10 5 Although Dura Pharmaceuticals
and its numerous amici in the securities and business arenas urged
stringent rules that would have required proof of a direct tie between a
previous misrepresentation and any subsequent stock decline, the
Supreme Court expressly declined to go that far. Instead, the Court held
that "[w]e need not, and do not, consider other proximate cause or loss-
related questions. ' '
2. Dura's Pleading Requirements: PSLRA's Procedure Truly Counts
The next section of the Dura opinion contains core guidance
regarding the loss-causation pleading requirements and confirms that
securities-fraud plaintiffs face no enhanced burdens in satisfactorily
alleging loss causation.0 7 The underlying case was at the motion-to-
dismiss stage and the Court was aware that the Ninth Circuit had
already granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.'0 8 The Court
declined to adopt the Solicitor General's argument that the Federal
Rule's particularity requirements applied to the elements of causation
and economic loss and that the PSLRA had raised the pleading
standards as to these elements.' 9 Rather, to successfully plead loss
speaks in terms of when "the relevant truth begins to leak out." Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1631.
105. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 19-20. The Solicitor General stated that this could occur
"if the company corrected the false information and at the same time issued unrelated positive
information." Id. And the Supreme Court's opinion acknowledges the possibility of "a claim
that a share's higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been-a claim we do not
consider here." Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1632.
106. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1633-34. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation By Presumption?
Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. L. J. 533
(2005) (arguing against loss causation as a basis for securities fraud decisions). This article,
written prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Dura, derided the Ninth Circuit's "loss causation"
decision. Professor Coffee joined Dura Pharmaceuticals and its amici in urging the Supreme
Court not only to reverse the Ninth Circuit, but to adopt the "stock drop" rule. Dura
Pharmaceuticals cited the article in a supplemental pleading accepted by the Supreme Court just
weeks before the Court's decision. Thus, all of Professor Coffee's views, as expressed in the
article, were before the Court when it made its decision.
107. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634.
108. Plaintiffs' counsel Patrick Coughlin reminded the Supreme Court that the Ninth Circuit
had already granted leave to amend, and explained that plaintiffs could add more facts explaining
how Dura Pharmaceuticals' AlSpiros misstatements caused plaintiffs' losses. Transcript, supra
note 104, at 43. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit "for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion." Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1628. The Ninth Circuit then
remanded with directions that the plaintiffs be permitted to replead their claims in light of the
Supreme Court's rulings. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., No. 01-57136 (9th Cir. June 27, 2005)
("On remand, plaintiffs-appellants shall be afforded an opportunity to amend their complaint,
inter alia, in a manner that complies with Broudo's requirements for loss-causation.").
109. See Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1636-37 (noting that both the Solicitor General and Dura
Pharmaceuticals had argued that loss-causation allegations must be stated with particularity under
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causation in a securities-fraud action, plaintiffs simply need to allege a
"'short and plain statement"' of the loss and how defendants caused it,
sufficient to provide defendants with "'fair notice[.]""' This should
not be difficult, the Court explained, because satisfactory loss-causation
allegations need only "provide a defendant with some indication of the
loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind." '
Clearly, the Court means for this pleading exercise to be a fairly
simple one focused on the plaintiffs subjective belief of how the
defendant caused the loss." 2 Twice, in fact, the Supreme Court explains
that the plaintiff needs only to allege an "indication" of the economic
loss and proximate cause that "the plaintiff has in mind.""3  This
language, considered in conjunction with the Court's acknowledgment
that a "tangle of factors" related to price will have to be sorted out at the
proof stage," 4 makes clear that the Court does not intend for the motion-
to-dismiss stage to become a mini-trial on loss-causation scenarios.
Professor Coffee, in analyzing the loss-causation question presented
to the Supreme Court, has noted the truism that "procedure counts."
' 5
If procedure counts, courts should not make case-dispositive loss-
causation determinations at the pleading stage simply because the case
does not involve a final, dramatic disclosure that causes a stock price to
plummet. Further, the PSLRA specifically allows plaintiffs to plead
loss causation without specificity." 6  In Dura, the Supreme Court
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)); see also U.S. Brief, supra note 104 at 15 (arguing that to
establish loss causation in a fraud-on-the-market case, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the
inflation in the price of the security attributable to the misrepresentation was eliminated or
reduced); Reply Brief of Petitioners at 10-11, Dura, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (No. 03-932) [hereinafter
Dura Reply Brief] (arguing respondent's attempts to distinguish the burden of "pleading" and
"proof' under the PSLRA are disingenuous); Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1636 (noting that the Solicitor
General also argued that loss-causation allegations must satisfy the heightened pleading
requirements of the PSLRA); Transcript, supra note 104, at 20 (expressing skepticism of the
Solicitor General's heightened pleading requirements). The Supreme Court ultimately did not
impose the heightened pleading requirements Dura Pharmaceuticals and the Solicitor General
requested for the elements of causation and economic loss. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634.
110. See Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634 (stating that "fair notice" requires the plaintiff to identify
his claim and the grounds upon which it rests).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 1632.
115. Coffee, supra note 106, at 539, 547. Throughout his article, Professor Coffee takes issue
with the loss-causation approach suggested in a companion Business Lawyer article written by his
Columbia Law School colleague Professor Merritt Fox. Coffee, supra note 106, at 533-48.
Professor Coffee says that the differences between him and Professor Fox may "well boil
down ... to my insistence that procedure counts." Id. at 539 (emphasis in original). And again,
in his conclusion: "Procedure counts." Id. at 547. See also Fox, supra note 6, at 507.
116. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (describing the PSLRA's provisions).
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appears to agree.' 17
Procedurally, the PSLRA only requires that plaintiffs ultimately
prove loss causation and not that they plead it with unshakeable
specificity. Section 21D(b)'s statutory text, on its face, imposes
particularized pleading requirements for falsity and scienter
allegations.'1 8 First, "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged
to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."" 9
Second, with respect to fraudulent intent, Congress again specified
that, "the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."1 20
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that "[t]his is not an easy standard to
comply with-it was not intended to be-and plaintiffs must be held to
it.'' Further, subsection (b)(3) commands that "the court shall, on the
motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the [falsity and
scienter] requirements ... are not met."'' 22
The statute never calls for dismissal, however, if plaintiffs fail to
plead loss causation with particularity. 23  To the contrary, when the
117. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634. In Dura, the Court held that plaintiffs satisfy the pleading of
loss causation with nothing more than a "short and plain statement" of the loss sufficient to
provide defendants "fair notice." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The
statement need only "provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal
connection that the plaintiff has in mind." Id. (emphasis added); see also infra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text (stating that Dura reaffirms the previous decision in Conley that to show loss
causation the pleading need only contain a "short and plain statement").
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) to 4(b)(2) (2000) (stating "the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed"); Gebhardt v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 830 n.3 (noting Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b), 109 Stat. 737 (1995)).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (emphasis added).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
121. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). In the
joint House-Senate Conference Report that accompanied the PSLRA, Congress noted the "need
to establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless
lawsuits," and so intended the PSLRA "to strengthen existing pleading requirements." H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 (1995).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(a). The Solicitor General had tried to assert that the heightened
pleading requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) should apply to loss causation. U.S. Brief, supra
note 104, at 15. The Supreme Court declined to adopt this position. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634.
123. Thus, loss causation is subject to ordinary notice pleading rules, so that "[alt the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for
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complaint survives a motion challenging the pleadings, the statute
specifies that the plaintiff then "shall have the burden of proving that
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter
caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."
124
Congress did not detail how this proof must ultimately be presented, let
alone command that it must be adduced with specificity at the pleading
stage.1
25
Aside from the PSLRA's clear text and the Supreme Court's binding
ruling in Dura, the realities of pleading also undermine suggestions that
loss causation be subjected to a dispositive analysis at a lawsuit's
earliest stages.126  A complex scheme's impact on a company's stock
price ordinarily requires expert analysis to eliminate market variables
and isolate company-specific information, which may involve an event
study with regression analysis, or even discovery, for a full
understanding of the scheme, its scope, and duration. 127  With the
PSLRA's automatic stay of discovery until after a determination of the
pleadings' sufficiency,1 28 such a full analysis may simply be impossible
to perform at the pleading stage. It is better left for proof, as the statute
dictates, at summary judgment or trial. The Supreme Court itself has
held that complicated issues like stock valuation and market reactions
are better left for trial, to be sorted out by the factfinder. 129 The Court
reaffirmed that view in Dura.1
30
on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are
necessary to support the claim." NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (defining the
standard pleading requirements) with FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (defining the heightened pleading
standard for cases of fraud).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (emphasis added).
125. See supra, notes 120-24 and accompanying text (detailing specificity of proof at the
pleading stage).
126. See infra notes 127-30 (demonstrating the necessity for factfinder review of causation).
127. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modem Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. L. J. 1, 18-19 (1982) (discussing finance theory
and various market studies).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D).
129. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.29 (1988).
[T]here may be a certain incongruity between the assumption that Basic shares are
traded on a well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry market, and the
allegation that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic
shares depressed, for 14 months, on the basis of the three public statements. Proof of
that sort is a matter for trial ....
Id.
130. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1634-35 (2005).
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C. Arguments Rejected by the Dura Court
While the foregoing explains what the Supreme Court's Dura
opinion holds, the opinion is also notable for what it does not hold.' 3'
Dura Pharmaceuticals and its amici tried mightily to convince the
Supreme Court to raise both the proof and the pleading bars of
securities-fraud actions well out of reach of many defrauded
investors. 32 A reasoned analysis of the Dura opinion shows that their
efforts failed. 133
1. Abandoning the Basic Rule
First, Dura Pharmaceuticals and commentators like Professor Coffee
hoped the Court might reconsider the holding in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.134  Basic created a rebuttable presumption of plaintiffs'
reliance on the integrity of a security's stated market price. According
to Professor Coffee, this presumption could have been significantly
curtailed in Dura.'35 The Court instead repeatedly cited Basic with
approval, used Basic to lay out a securities-fraud action's basic
elements, and reaffirmed the provision of a rebuttable presumption of
investors' reliance on a stock's public market price.
136
2. Requiring that Loss Causation be Pleaded with Specificity
Dura Pharmaceuticals and the Solicitor General had urged the
Supreme Court to hold that loss causation needed to be pleaded, like
falsity and scienter, with Rule 9(b) particularity. 37 The Justices reacted
to that argument with skepticism at the January 12, 2005, oral argument,
and the Court's opinion does not adopt the argument. 13  In fact, Dura
reaffirms the vitality of Conley v. Gibson139 and the requirement that,
131. See infra Parts III.C.1-3 (discussing the Court's rejection of various arguments brought
forth by petitioners).
132. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Dura and its amici's attempt to argue for heightening
both the proof and pleading requirements in securities-fraud cases).
133. See infra Part IIl.C.3 (explaining why the Supreme Court in Dura rejected Dura's
arguments).
134. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (holding that it is appropriate to apply a
rebuttable presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-market theory).
135. Coffee, supra note 106, at 544, 546 (arguing for a "stock-drop" rule in place of "loss
causation").
136. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631, 1634 (2005).
137. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 15; Dura Reply Brief, supra note 109, at 11.
138. Justice Ginsburg, for example, specifically stated to the government during oral
argument, "I thought you pointed to the 9(b) rule because fraud must be pleaded with
particularity, but causation does not, not under the rules and not under the statute." Transcript,
supra note 104, at 20.
139. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil
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absent special pleading rules, a complaint need only provide a "'short
and plain statement"' of loss causation. 140  "[I]t should not prove
burdensome," explained the Court, "for a plaintiff who has suffered an
economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss
and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind."'' 41  That
explanation is consistent with the Court's earlier observation that the
"tangle of factors affecting price" will be part of the proof of loss
causation142 and a fact-intensive inquiry clearly reserved for trial.
3. Requiring a Direct Link Between A Corrective Disclosure and A
Stock Price Drop
Next, the Court declined to adopt the argument, urged by Dura
Pharmaceuticals and its amici, that loss causation requires that there
always exist a corrective disclosure specifically linked to a final stock
drop. 143 Professor Coffee had asserted that absent a dramatic reaction to
a disclosure contradicting the defendants' earlier representation, loss
determinations are necessarily speculative or hypothetical. Instead, the
Supreme Court explained in Dura's "proof' discussion that plaintiffs'
economic loss may occur as the "relevant truth begins to leak out," or as
"the truth makes its way into the market place." '44  Importantly, the
Court did not require an explicit corrective disclosure as the mechanism
Procedure require only a "short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests").
140. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634 (citation omitted); see also U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 15.
The Solicitor General also argued that allegations dealing with the element of loss causation
"must satisfy the pleading requirements added to the 1934 Act by the PSLRA, see 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(1) and (2)." U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 15. This argument, as replied to at oral
argument by Justice Ginsburg, fared little better than the Solicitor General's Rule 9(b) contention.
Transcript, supra note 104, at 20.
141. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634.
142. Id. at 1632.
143. Id. A more pernicious extension of that argument further urged the Court to hold that the
final drop in response to such a disclosure should be, in every case, the total measure of
plaintiffs' damages. If this argument had been accepted, defendants would be able to use the
PSLRA's 90-day look-back provision (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1)), and defendants also would be
able to argue that because the stock eventually bounced back above its post-disclosure final drop,
plaintiffs suffered no loss at all in the case. The "look back provision" requires that:
[T]he award of damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the
purchase or sale price paid ... by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean
trading price of the security during the ninety-day period beginning on the date on
which the information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the
action is disseminated to the market.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(l) (2000).
144. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1631-32. At oral argument, Justice Breyer recognized the truth
might come out in "subtle ways as well as direct ways." Transcript, supra note 104, at 55.
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by which the truth "leak[ed]" out.145
As one of this article's authors explained at oral argument, there are
myriad ways in which the truth involving defendants' fraud can be
communicated to the market, thereby removing inflation from the stock
price and harming investors.1 46 In fact, the Justices at oral argument
recognized that fraud-induced inflation can be removed in a number of
ways. 147  The Supreme Court has now confirmed that plaintiffs need
only provide defendants with "some indication" of the connection
between that leakage and plaintiffs' claimed economic lOSS.148  In
requiring a plaintiff to prove economic loss by pointing to factors
related to the fraud, the Supreme Court in Dura recognized that fraud
could cause losses by a variety of means other than explicit corrective
disclosures. 49  This Section discusses several alternate means and
shows that the Supreme Court correctly rejected Dura Pharmaceuticals'
desired rule.
a. Alternate Methods of Correcting Fraud and Determining Loss
i. Subsequent Price Increases and Manipulated Earnings Projections
As the Solicitor General asserted in Dura, "inflation attributable to a
misrepresentation might be reduced or eliminated even if there were a
net increase in price."'150 The Solicitor General did not argue that loss
causation requires a corrective disclosure-only that "the truth was
revealed (at least in part) and the inflation in the price of the security
attributable to the misrepresentation was thereby eliminated (or
reduced) to the plaintiffs detriment."' 15 ' As an example, the Solicitor
General found that inflation could be eliminated without a drop in the
price-and perhaps even with a rise-if a company were to "correct ...
the false information and at the same time issue ... unrelated positive
information."'52 The Solicitor General specifically noted that "fraud can
be revealed by means other than a corrective disclosure, and a drop in
145. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1632.
146. Transcript, supra note 104, at 33.
147. Id.
148. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634.
149. See Infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing losses not caused by corrective disclosures).
150. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 27. In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged this
scenario, but declined to address it. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1632.
151. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 16. The Supreme Court's opinion speaks in terms of the
"relevant truth" reaching the market-not of corrective disclosures tied to stock drops. Dura, 125
S. Ct. at 1631. That the inflation only need be "reduced," according to Professor Coffee, requires
very little. Coffee, supra note 106, at 550.
152. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 19-20.
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the stock price may not be a necessary condition for establishing loss
causation in every fraud-on-the-market case. To the extent that courts
or litigants have suggested otherwise, they are mistaken,"'
53
The reasons for this are not complex. Market valuations are based
upon expected future cash flows discounted by the cost of capital.
154
These cash flows are commonly referred to as discounted cash flows.
Open-market frauds commonly manipulate stock market price increases
by artificially raising cash flow expectations. Conversely, cash-flow
expectations just as easily can be lowered to reduce fraud-induced
inflation without an overt disclosure of the fraud by defendants issuing
further statements--true or false--that on their face may or may not
appear to be directly related to the original fraud.
For example, a defendant corporation that falsified historical earnings
to increase projected cash flow may reduce future cash-flow
expectations by either announcing lower-than-expected revenues or
earnings, or that it needs to increase its cash reserves for a new product
or business initiative. Either of these actions may reduce fraud-based
inflation without any "corrective disclosures" bearing a clear relation to
the earlier fraud, let alone any dramatic stock drops on disclosures of
the fraud. However, each is a revelation of the true financial condition
or operations of the company in contrast to earlier misrepresentations.
So long as cash-flow expectations purport to provide some indication of
the true state of defendant corporations' operations, however, false
statements may be regarded as having caused plaintiffs' economic
loss. 155
ii. Passage of Time
Even the passage of time will dissipate a major fraud's impact on a
153. U.S. Brief, supra note 104, at 19.
154. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON
STOCKS 67-72, 78 n.1 (1983) (analyzing common stock valuation and fluctuations with
inflation); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND
VALUATION 77 (2003) (demonstrating how to calculate a present value through finance);
EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 87-89 (1972) (outlining
various financial cash flows and earnings formulas); Burton G. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market
Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313, 1316 (1989) (detailing the standard "rational" model of share
pricing); Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 415-16 (1961) (utilizing the discounted cash flow approach to value
shares); see also Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & James R. Banko, Securities Fraud,
Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss
Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1421-24 (2004) (analyzing a stock price as a discounted value of
a future cash flow).
155. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (explaining how truth makes its way into
the marketplace).
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stock's price. Inflation from sales or asset overstatements dissipates
over time, for instance, as does inflation due to earnings
misstatements.156 This occurs again as a new picture of the company's
operations hits the market over time. Because investors rely on recent
earnings to project future cash flows, the effect of an earlier
overstatement fades with the passage of each subsequent quarter.
157
Justice Breyer suggests that time can make the connection between
fraud and loss more attenuated."' While time may certainly make it
tougher to disentangle other market forces, et cetera, this determination
should be reserved for experts at the proof stage of the litigation and not
the pleading stage.1
59
Thus, truthful disclosure of falsified quarterly earnings that would
have been quite material to the market at the time of the earnings
announcement may be rendered far less important years later, when
more recent quarterly performance information is available that
provides a truer picture of the company's operations. But the lack of a
visceral, dramatic stock decline accompanying that final disclosure does
not mean that the "truth" has not leaked into the market during the
156. See Marcia Kramer Mayer, Ph.D., Presentation at PLI Securities Litigation &
Enforcement Institute 2004: Loss Causation and Damages: Dura and Beyond (Sept. 30, 2004)
(stating "inflation declines between purchase and corrective disclosure"); see also In re Initial
Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (claiming "ordinary market
forces affect the rate of artificial inflation" because in some circumstances "the normal
functioning of the securities market causes the inflationary effect to dissipate over time"); A. A.
Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 264, 269 (1931) (finding
that "a false statement. .. some years ago would have little appreciable effect on the price of the
stock today").
157. Section 10(b) claims must be filed within five years of the violation, but five years is
eons in the stock market.
158. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1632. "Other things being equal, the longer the time between
purchase and sale, the more likely that this is so, i.e., the more likely that other factors caused the
loss." Id.
159. See, e.g., id. (noting, in section of opinion dealing with what plaintiffs must eventually
prove, that a "tangle of factors" affects a share's price); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 249 n.29 (1988) (holding that materiality was to be determined on a case by case factual
basis).
We note there may be a certain incongruity between the assumption that Basic shares
are traded on a well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry market, and the
allegation that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic
shares depressed, for 14 months, on the basis of the three public statements. Proof of
that sort is a matter for trial ....
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 249 n.29; DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 110, 124
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that actual causes of stock decline "are all matters for the factfinder
on a fully-developed record"); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 02 C 8324, 32
Empl. Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1699, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3241, at *19 (N.D. I11. 2004)
(explaining that "issues of loss causation are factual matters not proper to resolve on a motion to
dismiss").
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ensuing years. If plaintiffs can plead and prove that the leakage caused
them economic loss, the loss causation element should be satisfied.' 6°
Recovery should not be denied merely because the defendants managed
to conceal their fraud until after the company failed and its stock
became worthless.'
61
iii. Leakage and Market Reactions
Requiring in every case a stock drop following formal disclosure also
ignores the fact that our markets are sufficiently efficient to reflect
much information before its formal announcement. The academic
finance literature tells us that securities prices often incorporate new
information before it is formally announced. 62  Prices may decline, for
example, on rumors of insider trading long before anticipated bad news
is formally released and made a matter of public record. 163  Often,
160. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1965). Comment b specifies that far
from barring damages, the company's insolvency may in appropriate cases provide the basis for
additional recovery. Comment b explains that:
[W]hen the financial condition of a corporation is misrepresented and it is subsequently
driven into insolvency by reason of the depressed condition of an entire industry,
which has no connection with the facts misrepresented, it may still be found that the
misrepresentation was a legal cause of the ... loss, since it may appear that if the
company had been in sound condition it would have survived the depression, and
hence that a loss of this kind might reasonably have been expected to follow.
Id.
162. See, e.g., JAMES H. LoRiE, PETER DODD & MARY HAMILTON KIMPTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 100-02 (2d ed. 1985) (citing research indicating that price
adjustments occur in advance of formal earnings announcements); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 185 (6th ed. 1996) (stating "[r]esearch indicates that, on
average, stock prices react well in advance of unexpectedly good or unexpectedly bad earnings
reports[]"); WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS 522 (4th ed. 1990)
(summarizing research showing that "prices of firms that announced unexpectedly low
earnings... tended to decrease prior to the announcement"); Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An
Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 159, 160-70 & Fig. 1
(1968) ("The information contained in the annual income number is useful if actual income
differs from expected income, the market typically has reacted in the same direction."); Sara
Fisher Ellison & Wallace P. Mullin, Gradual Incorporation of Information Into Stock Prices:
Empirical Strategies 4, 13-14 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 6218,
1997) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6218 (noting the large body of data showing
price effects weeks in advance of major announcements).
163. Ellison, et al., supra note 162, at 3-4, 11-17. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983),
stock sales by investors with access to adverse inside information regarding a company's
accounting improprieties drove its stock from $26 per share to less than $15 per share in two
weeks--causing the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading-before any public disclosure of
the accounting fraud. Id. at 649-50, rev'g Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974), trading by insiders who knew of undisclosed
favorable information "pushed the price of [the] stock by February 18 to nearly three-and-one-
half times what it had been at the beginning of the year." SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1307
n.3 (2d Cir. 1974).
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disclosures of varying credibility gradually become public throughout a
lengthy period, so that the market will not react noticeably at the final
disclosure. ' 64 But under the Supreme Court's analysis, that ultimate
non-reaction is immaterial, provided the earlier leaks are sufficiently
linked to the truth about defendants' operations.'
65
iv. Concealment Issues
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Dura Pharmaceuticals'
insistence on bald corrective disclosure was impractical because
sophisticated individuals who choose to commit market manipulation
and fraud are likely to be adept at concealing it, too. Those individuals
could reduce or eliminate a disclosure's impact on stock price by
downplaying its significance, as Dura Pharmaceuticals did, or by
combining it with good news. 166 Having deliberately inflated the stock
with myriad misstatements, securities-fraud perpetrators could just as
easily "walk down" the stock price by the selective disclosure of
seemingly unrelated "bad" news concerning the company and thereby
avoid a sudden stock-price reaction, and insulate themselves from
liability.1 67  Thus, requiring stock drops following explicit corrective
disclosures would have empowered the very individuals who committed
the original fraud, and perversely encouraged more misrepresentations
164. Cf. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that "the
prolonged nature of the fraud introduces other market variables which may affect the amount the
market react[s] to disclosures at different times during the class period").
165. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005).
166. On November 3, 1998, Dura revealed in a press release that the FDA had rejected its
AlSpiros new drug application-but minimized the fact that the FDA wanted Dura to "conduct a
completely new clinical data [study]." J.A., supra note 54, at 1 lOa-1 la. The FDA quickly issued
a notice of violation to Dura, charging that the company's press release was misleading. Letter
from Joan Hankin, Regulatory Review Officer for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to
Katherine Hefferman, Senior Manager of the Regulatory Affairs Department at Dura
Pharmaceuticals Inc., supra note 88.
The press release is misleading because through various speculative conclusions,
statements, terminology, and overall tone, the release misleadingly suggests that,
notwithstanding the submission of some 'additional' information for FDA evaluation,
the Agency has reviewed significant clinical evidence for AlSpiros and has determined
that the product will be found to be safe and effective for use.
Id.; see also No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (asserting that the disclosed problems would have no
financial or operational impact on the company where defendants prevented the "expected" stock
drops by issuing positive false statements with each release of the "bad news").
167. The Solicitor General recognized this very point in concluding that a corrective
disclosure and a stock drop may not be a necessary condition for establishing loss causation. U.S.
Brief, supra note 104, at 19. See also Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 966
(7th Cir. 1989) (observing that "a firm that lies about some assets cannot defeat liability by
showing that other parts of its business did better than expected, counterbalancing the loss").
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and concealment, not less.
b. Real-World Examples
Recent real-world events illustrate the problems with focusing
exclusively on disclosure-induced stock drops. Our capital markets
have been rocked by a series of stunning, multi-billion-dollar frauds in
recent years: Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth are just three
examples.1 68  Even today, the full import of these sophisticated frauds
are still being sorted out in civil and criminal actions, brought by private
litigants, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the
Department of Justice.' 69
i. Enron
In Enron, investors were victimized in an especially wide-ranging,
long-lasting and diabolically complicated fraud (effectively the largest
Ponzi scheme7 ° in American corporate history) that caused millions of
168. See infra Parts llI.C.3.b.i-iii (discussing three examples of disclosure-induced stock
drops).
169. In private securities-fraud class action litigation against Enron, for example, the plaintiffs
and their attorneys recovered (as of late summer 2005) a record $7.12 billion from some of the
various defendants. Stephen Taub, Enron Settlements Hit Record $7 Billion, CFO.com, Aug. 3,
2005, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/4245836?f=search. On the criminal side of Enron, former
Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow pleaded guilty in January 2004 to charges that he helped
orchestrate schemes to hide Enron's debt and inflate its profits; he is scheduled to serve a 10-year
prison sentence beginning in 2006, after he testifies against Enron president Kenneth Lay and
Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Skilling. Corporate Scandals, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June
29, 2005, at lB. In the WorldCom debacle, former chief executive Bernard Ebbers was
sentenced to 25 years in prison in July 2005 "for spearheading the largest accounting fraud in
U.S. history." Walter Hamilton, CEO's Steep Rise, Swift Fall End in 25-Year Prison Term, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 2005, at Al. Other corporate chieftans are also facing prison time for their roles
in recent corporate frauds. See, e.g., Tom Dochat, Rite Aid's Brown gets fine, 10 years sentence
tops those of 5 other executives, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 15, 2004 at A.01
(reporting former Vice Chairman Franklin C. Brown's 10-year prison sentence is longer than,
inter alia, the eight-year term handed to Rite Aid's former Chairman and CEO Martin L. Grass
and the 28 months being served by Rite Aid's former CFO Frank Bergonzi); Leon Lazaroff, Ex-
chiefs at Tyco get 8-25 years; Kozlowski, Swartz ordered to pay millions in fines, restitution,
BALT. SUN, Sept. 20, 2005, at IC (reporting that ex-Tyco CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski and former
CFO Mark Swartz were both sentenced to 8-to-25-year prison terms, in addition to restitution and
fines totaling $167 million and $72 million, respectively); Rigas Father and Son Sentenced to
Prison, MIAMI HERALD, June 21, 2005, at IC (reporting that Adelphia Communications, Inc.
founder John Rigas was sentenced to 15 years, and his ex-finance chief son Timothy was
sentenced to 20 years following convictions for "bank fraud ... securities fraud and conspiracy").
170. "Ponzi scheme" gets its name from a man who used investors' money to float debt.
The term 'Ponzi scheme' is derived from Charles Ponzi, a famous Boston swindler.
With a capital of $150, Ponzi began to borrow money on his own promissory notes at a
50% rate of interest payable in 90 days. Ponzi collected nearly $10 million in 8
months beginning in 1919, using the funds of new investors to pay off those whose
notes had come due.
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investors to overpay billions of dollars for Enron's nearly worthless
securities at prices as high as $90 per share.17 ' When the scheme finally
collapsed and Enron went bankrupt in December 2001, these investors
were left holding the bag: their shares of formerly high-flying Enron
stock selling for $0.26 on the last day of trading before the company
declared bankruptcy. 172  Those who had orchestrated Enron's sham
transactions, including defendant Merrill Lynch, insisted that they could
not be liable for any of the investors' losses because the fraudulent
nature of many transactions was not fully disclosed until after the
company declared bankruptcy. 1
73
Yet surely those fraudulent transactions contributed to the inflation in
Enron's stock price in the heady days before its collapse-inflation that,
logically, was removed from Enron's stock price as Enron descended
into insolvency and the truth about its operations seeped into the
marketplace. As Judge Harmon explained in the In re Enron Corp.
class action lawsuit, in rejecting Merrill Lynch's argument that it caused
no fraud-related losses because its role in Enron's sham transactions
was not disclosed until long after Enron stock had already collapsed:
While information about Merrill Lynch's individual role in [the
fraud] ... may not have been made public until long after the Enron
bankruptcy, that fact does not relieve Merrill Lynch of responsibility
for Enron's collapse; Merrill Lynch's alleged substantial participation
in the deceptive business practices contributed to the artificial inflation
of the price of the securities and thereby was a direct and major cause
of plaintiffs' financial loss .... "'
Thus, investors' "losses" proximately caused by defendants like
Merrill Lynch cannot sensibly be limited to the final, post-bankruptcy
stock decline of mere pennies.
United States v. Masten, 170 F.3d 790, 797 n.9 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Shelton,
669 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d
750, 759 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Generically, a Ponzi scheme is a phony investment plan in which
monies paid by later investors are used to pay artificially high returns to the initial investors, with
the goal of attracting more investors."); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (detailing
Ponzi's fraud scheme).
171. Enron Declares Bankruptcy; 4,000 Houston Employees Lose Their Jobs, HOUS. CHRON.,
Dec. 6, 2001.
172. Id.
173. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 310 F. Supp. 2d 819, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the
timing of the exposure of deceptive business practices that contribute to the artificial inflation of a
security does not matter).
174. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 310 F. Supp. 2d. at 832. See also Michael L. Cypers, John M.
Landry & William H. Forman, The Future of Loss Causation: Pleading Manipulative and
Deceptive Schemes to Avoid Dismissal, SEC. LITIG. J. (Winter/Spring 2005) (lawyers from Heller
Ehrman White & McAuliffe LLP examine scheme liability and conclude it is separate from the
narrow issue addressed in Dura dealing with misrepresentations or omissions).
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ii. WorldCom
Similarly, in the WorldCom litigation, certain defendants said that
loss causation could not be shown because most of the decline of
WorldCom's stock from over $60 a share to near zero took place before
WorldCom's admissions that it had overstated income by $3.8 billion.7 5
Not until months after the bankruptcy did WorldCom admit that the
overstatement actually might exceed $9 billion. 7 6 And not until March
12, 2004, some 20 months after the bankruptcy, did WorldCom admit
that its year 2000 and 2001 financial statements had been misstated by
over $74 billion.'7 With WorldCom shares selling for mere pennies by
then, the market reaction to an ultimate disclosure simply could not
occur. 17  That lack of reaction surely cannot mean that WorldCom
investors experienced no loss, however. To the contrary, investors paid
not only fraudulently inflated prices for WorldCom securities; the
inflation came out as WorldCom stock inexorably declined prior to the
March 2004 disclosure on the heels of truthful bad news entering the
marketplace about the company's operations. 79
iii. HealthSouth
Finally, in the HealthSouth matter, the sort of stunning disclosures
that Professor Coffee would likely say informed the market of fraud-a
huge accounting restatement and guilty pleas by company insiders-
came seven months after HealthSouth stock had already plummeted.
175. See Timothy R. Brown, WorldCom Inc. Says Nearly $3.8 Billion Hidden In Its Books,
CFO Fired, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, June 26, 2002 (explaining that the
SEC focused on attempting to return some $700 million to defrauded investors but limited the
relief to those who held WorldCom securities though the June 25, 2002 market close). See
Submission of the SEC Addressing the Issues Identified in the Court's May 19, 2003 Order
Concerning the Proposed Settlement of the Commission's Monetary Claims Against WorldCom,
Appendix, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2003); see also
WorldCom Victim Trust Website, http://www.worldcomvictimtrust.com (last visited Oct. 24,
2005). Surely the penny-stock speculators to be benefited at this juncture were not the defrauded
retirement funds-none of which remained in the stock to the end-that the PSLRA in particular
was enacted to protect.
176. WorldCom to Adjust Errors to $9 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at C3.
177. Andrew Countryman, WorldCom Wipes Slate Clean; $74.4 Billion in Profits Eliminated,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2004, at BI; WorldCom Restates Profits by $74.4 Billion for 2 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at C14.
178. According to the Bloomberg LP. stock-trading quotes for the days following the $74.4
billion restatement, WorldCom stock was trading at $0.23 on the day of its restatement
announcement and hovered between just $0.21-$0.22 over the next four trading days.
(Bloomberg printout on file with authors).
179. "By some estimates, WorldCom shareholders lost a collective $200 billion because of its
collapse." Christopher Stern, Judge Clears WorldCom's Reorganization; Telecommunications
Company Will Emerge From Bankruptcy Under MCI Name, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2003, at A04.
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On August 27, 2002, HealthSouth reduced its earnings guidance for the
year by $175 million, citing a change in Medicare reimbursement
policies, 80 -but that seemingly innocuous disclosure, with no overt
reference to the fraud's minutiae, surely reduced fraud-based inflation
by deflating fraud-produced expectations: HealthSouth's stock price
plunged nearly 60% in two days on the bad news, dropping from around
$12 to $5 per share (a multi-billion-dollar market-cap loss).81 Some
investors filed suit.18 2  Not until February 2003, however, did an FBI
and Department of Justice criminal investigation become public,
183
followed in March 2003 by the first of over a dozen HealthSouth
insiders entering guilty pleas to criminal violations of the securities laws
that had contributed to HealthSouth's overstating some $2.7 billion in
"earnings" from 1996 to 2002."4
The market's reaction to the blockbuster February/March disclosures
reduced HealthSouth's stock from $3 per share to well under a dollar. 85
This was a visible drop, to be sure, yet far less than the nearly $7-per-
share August 2002 plunge. 8 6 Under the view of market movement held
by Dura Pharmaceuticals and its amici, however, investors' "loss" could
be limited to the stock's final whimper--not the original 60%, $7-per-
180. Mary Haffenberg, HealthSouth's Comeback Flames Out, THESTREET.COM, Aug. 27,
2002, http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/markets/marketfeatures/10039496.htm ("HealthSouth said
its annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization will probably fall by $175
million, making its previous guidance for the current and coming years meaningless.");
HealthSouth halts guidance, CNNMoney.com, Aug. 27, 2002,
http://money.cnn.com/2002/08/27/news/companies/healthsouth/index.htm.
181. Tom Bassing, Analysts Blast HealthSouth, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., Aug. 30, 2002,
available at http:www.bizjoumals.com/birmingham/stories/2002/09/02/storyl.html ("By the end
of the two-day swoon, HealthSouth's stock had lost nearly 58 percent of its value, falling from a
Tuesday opening price of $11.97 to Wednesday's close of $5.05.").
182. Tom Bassing, Scrushy hires Clinton spin doctor, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., Sept. 27, 2002,
available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/birminghan/stories/2002109/30/story2.html (reporting
"a slew of investor lawsuits filed against [HealthSouth]").
183. Milt Freudenheim, F.B.L Is Investigating HealthSouth Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003,
at Cl.
184. Ex-CFO Owens Pleads Guilty, Digital Hospital Halted, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., Mar. 28,
2003 (HealthSouth chief financial officer William Owens "pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court
to charges of wire and securities fraud" while former "CFO Weston Smith last week pleaded
guilty to criminal fraud and conspiracy charges"); HealthSouth CFO to plead guilty; Judge
freezes founder's assets, CHI. TRB., Mar. 27, 2003 (Owens's plea "came a week after former
CFO Weston Smith agreed to plead guilty to similar charges"). HealthSouth founder Richard
Scrushy fought his criminal charges, however, and was acquitted by a Birmingham, Alabama jury
in summer 2005. Jay Reeves, Scrushy Wins Acquittal, Faces Civil Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
June 30, 2005, at 4.
185. Roy L. Williams, Stock Plunge Stings Investors in HealthSouth, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
Mar. 26, 2003 (reporting HealthSouth shares closed "at 11 cents each" on Tuesday, March 25,
2003).
186. See supra note 181 (explaining that HealthSouth stock dropped $6.92 over two days).
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share plunge that we now know with certainty was linked to
HealthSouth's financial shenanigans.' 7 That view is mistaken, for even
if the market's reaction to a fraud's disclosure accurately reflects the
importance of information at the time of that final disclosure, it says
little about the importance of the misstatements in the market at the time
of plaintiff s stock purchase.
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES PROOF AND PLEADING AFTER DURA
Several commentators, including Professor John Coffee, have
attempted to use the Dura case as an opportunity to advance their
theories regarding restrictions on open-market securities class action
suits. In its holding concerning proof and pleading requirements, the
Court ultimately rejected their views. Their arguments are ill grounded,
and fail to accurately reflect the typical fact pattern underlying open-
market securities actions. This Part endeavors to show that such
arguments have little basis and should not be followed in future
securities actions in light of the Dura decision.
A. Investors' Fraud Recoveries Are Not Mere "Wealth Transfers"
Between the Corporations' Former and Present Shareholders
Professor Coffee urges a narrow view of loss causation, apparently
assuming that in the "secondary" trading market, at least, securities-
fraud lawsuits typically ensnare a corporation that had no motive for
fraud. 8  Unless the corporation issued inflated stock in a public
offering, it is suggested, a judgment or settlement borne by the
corporation (and indirectly, by its current shareholders) is merely a
wasteful "wealth transfer" between two classes of shareholders-
187. See generally Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
appellant's argument that the loss must be determined by the change in price after a corrective
release and holding that such a drop "is of course circumstantial evidence of the inflation when
purchased, but it is not the exclusive method of measuring inflation[]"). Other market variables,
including the passage of time, or changed conditions and partial disclosures, may affect later
market reaction-necessitating expert testimony and the examination of company-specific
information to determine the actual inflation on the date of purchase. Id. at 906-07 n.22, 909
n.25. Importantly, the Supreme Court declined Dura Pharmaceuticals' (and its amicis') invitation
to limit recoverable economic loss to any final stock drop. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S.
Ct. 1627, 1633-34 (2005) ("We need not, and do not, consider other proximate cause or loss-
related questions.").
188. Coffee, supra note 106, at 541. The so-called "secondary market" includes "exchanges
and over-the-counter markets where securities are bought and sold subsequent to original
issuance, which took place in the primary market." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 615 (6th ed. 2003). "Proceeds
of secondary market sales accrue to the selling dealers and investors, not to the companies that
originally issued the securities." Id.
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"neither of whom is necessarily culpable. ' 89
Neither thesis is borne out by logic or experience, however. The
notion that a corporation should not be liable for its wrongs because its
current shareholders are not necessarily culpable is a radical one that,
logically extended, would do away with most criminal and civil liability
for large companies and would leave them free to run amok.
Corporations are legally responsible for the false statements in their
press releases and financial filings,' 90 as well as for the fraudulent acts
of their executives because a corporation can only act through its
officers and directors.' 9' And, in its most recent comprehensive study of
securities class actions, Cornerstone Research's "2004: A Year in
Review" calculates that 79% of all securities class action complaints in
2004 contained allegations of misrepresentations in corporations'
financial documents, and nearly 50% alleged violations of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles. 92  Imagine the consequences if
corporate defendants who falsified their financial results could avoid
liability by showing that shareholders were kept in the dark: their very
fraud would become a defense.
The "wealth transfer" suggestion is similarly bereft. Those who
subscribe to it' 93 appear to be saying that: (1) the shareholders in the
class of defrauded stock purchasers are in much the same position as
later purchasers; and (2) diversified shareholders are "maximizing" their
wealth due to their trading patterns-presumably at the expense of less-
diversified investors. 94
Neither assumption is warranted, for investors are constantly making
189. Coffee, supra note 106, at 541.
190. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (holding, under §
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, liability against a corporation for misstatements in its
registration statement "is virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements"); accord Jennifer
H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 696 (1992) (explaining that "many decisions simply treat the
corporation itself as the person uttering the fraudulent statements and hold it liable for false
statements made in its name, such as those in required filings with the SEC").
191. Buxton v. Diversified Resources Corp., 634 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1980) (by signing
audit statements, company president "render[ed] the corporation responsible for the audit
statements"); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 560 (1st Cir. 1978) ("While a corporation does
have an immortal existence, it can conduct its affairs only through its officers and employees.").
192. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILING 2004: A YEAR IN
REVIEW, at 16, (2004), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2004_YIR/2004010305.pdf [hereinafter
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH].
193. Coffee, supra note 106, at 541.
194. This second point Professor Coffee made in more detail at the Institute for Law and
Economic Policy conference held on April 7-9, 2005.
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investment decisions. Those made prior to disclosure of fraud or the
truth-reducing expectations reflect one set of variables. Investment
decisions made after disclosure of the fraud or the truth-reducing
expectations, on the other hand, involve different considerations and a
lower price.'95  Academic evidence shows that while stock prices
generally decline upon the fraud's revelation, there usually are no
statistically significant price movements associated with the resolutions
of securities-fraud cases. 96 Thus, recoveries are not simply a shifting of
money from the right to the left pocket even if an investor makes the
decision to stay in the stock. 197 The decision to stay is in and of itself a
new investment decision, and the new price already reflects the earlier
disclosures and the existence of the litigation.
9 8
The notion that diversified shareholders are benefited more than other
investors by class actions'" also finds no support. Institutional investors
typically make up more than 50% of the shareholder base,200 and
perhaps do recover more, and more often, but most certainly in line with
their purchasing (and selling).
Professor Coffee insists both that securities class actions be curtailed
because they entail expensive "wealth transfers" and advances another
(and apparently inconsistent) argument: that the wealth transfers are
trivial.201 He says recent publications on the recovery rates in securities
195. E.g., Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 228 (8th Cir. 1975) ("By continuing to hold
the stock after" the date a securities fraud was disclosed, the investor "has, in effect, made a
second investment decision unrelated to his initial decision to purchase the stock.");
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(concluding that a once defrauded investor who is "on notice of the alleged misstatements" but
does not "dispose of its stock or seek rescission" has "made a new investment decision to play the
market by retaining" the shares).
196. Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class
Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Paper # 01-009, JOHN M. OLIN CTR.
FOR L. & ECON., 36 (Oct. 2001) ("The returns from the date that the decision on the motion to
dismiss is announced are not, however, statistically significant.").
197. Coffee, supra note 106, at 543. Professor Coffee says "a windfall is awarded to one class
of shareholders (typically, the buying shareholders) at the expense of other shareholders." Id.
Because the price following disclosure reflects the reduced expectations, this is simply not so.
And because the statistical evidence demonstrates there is no second drop upon resolution, the
recoveries are not at the expense of those that retain or purchase.
198. Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465
(2004). The costs associated with securities class actions are outweighed by the benefits of
pursuing such actions in a variety of ways. Id. at 1466. First, private enforcement reduces
government involvement and costs. Second, class actions help ensure accountability of corporate
officers and directors. Id. By any measure, reducing the risk of fraud far outweighs any assumed
harm to current shareholders.
199. Coffee, supra note 106, at 542.
200. Id. at 541.
201. Id. at 542.
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class actions show that recoveries are extremely modest, totaling only
2.7% to 2.8% of investor losses.2 °2 Ironically, however, these low
figures, designed to trivialize securities class actions, come from
comparing recovery rates to overall market losses and not to losses
caused by fraud. 203 This is truly like comparing apples to oranges, for
damages due to fraud are often but a fraction of overall market losses.
2 4
Congress understood this when enacting the PSLRA, noting analysis
provided to the Senate Securities Subcommittee which found that, even
from a plaintiff's perspective, alleged fraud-related damages in
securities litigation typically comprised but 27.7% of overall market
losses.2 °5
When using an honest comparison of apples to apples, actual
recovery rates of fraud-related losses are likely much higher than the
2.7% to 2.8% figures that Professor Coffee proffers. Cornerstone
Research calculates that the overall market losses on investments in
covered securities, for all cases filed in 2003, were $542 billion.2°6 But
no one seriously contends that all---or even most-of that $542 billion
is loss attributable to fraud.2 °7 Using a method commonly employed by
defendants that measures potentially recoverable "damages" on the
frauds' final disclosures, Cornerstone calculates fraud-caused losses of
$57.7 billion.208  This is a figure markedly lower than the 2003 overall
market losses of $542 billion.2 °9 While recovery of $15.18 billion in
securities-fraud lawsuits amounts to but 2.7%-2.8% of the overall
202. Id.
203. See Elaine Buckberg, et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Bear
Market Cases Bring Big Settlements, at 8-9 (Feb. 2005),
http://www.nera.com/image/Recent-TrendsFinal_2.28.05.pdf. The basis for these assertions
appears to be the settlement statistics prepared by National Economic Research Associates
(NERA). Id. at 12. NERA itself acknowledges that the investor losses as calculated are
misleading and an exaggerated measure of damages leading to a substantial underestimation of
investor recoveries. Id. at 8 ("Investor recoveries are frequently-but inaccurately-assessed by
comparing settlement values to investor losses.").
204. Id. at 9 ("[C]alculations of the loss attributable to the fraud typically generate numbers
substantially lower than investor losses.").
205. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (Conf. Rep.) (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 741.
206. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 192, at 2.
207. Id. at 10 (listing overall market "Maximum Dollar Loss" of $542 billion for Year 2003,
and comparing to the estimated $57.7 billion "Disclosure Dollar Loss" that occurred following
frauds' disclosures).
208. See id. at 5-10 (discussing methods of calculation).
209. Id. at 10. Economic experts often use the price decline following the final disclosures as
a basis to measure the inflation in the stock. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating final "drop is of course circumstantial evidence of the inflation when
purchased").
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market losses associated with the securities at issue, when compared
with the $57.7 billion highlighted by Cornerstone as potentially
recoverable damages, it yields a much more impressive recovery rate of
26%. In other words, using securities-fraud defendants' own yardstick,
the recovery rate is 26% of potentially recoverable damages.
Taking into account that not all investors file claims, of course, the
actual recovery for those who do can be significantly higher.:1 In
addition, given the increase in dismissals following the PSLRA's
passage, the instances where the companies have failed, or where there
is no available insurance or viable defendant, recovery rates in securities
class actions are substantial, and significant real dollars are recovered
by the private class-action mechanism for fraud victims211
210. See Buckberg, et al., supra note 203, at 9 (noting that shareholders who file claims
"typically receive twice as much compensation per share" as the aggregate settlement would
suggest, because "many shareholders do not file claims").
211. Professor Coffee notes that few securities cases go to trial. Coffee, supra note 106, at
537. But if just under 1% of all complex securities cases go to trial, only 1.7% of all federal civil
cases, in general, actually reach trial according to the latest federal judicial caseload statistics
compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, Table C-4, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/ tables/CO4MarO4.pdf
(Mar. 31, 2004) (noting percentage of civil actions reaching trial during the 12-month period
ending March 31, 2004). If only complex cases were considered, the number likely would be in
line with the complex securities class action cases filed and tried.
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B. The Same Facts Can Show Both "Loss Causation" and
"Transaction Causation. "212
Some commentators seem to suggest that the same facts ought never
be used to show both reliance, or "transaction causation," and proximate
cause, or "loss causation., 213 This is surely wrong. Nothing in the law
requires such mutual exclusivity among the pieces of evidence used to
establish elements of a cause of action.21 4 For example, in the
securities-fraud context, falsity and scienter are often inferred from the
same facts.215 If reliance and proximate cause were both elements of
212. Transaction causation has long gone by the name "reliance." See, e.g., Castellano v.
Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "transaction causation is
generally understood as reliance"); accord Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 828
(8th Cir. 2003) (comparing transaction causation to reliance); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst &
Young, 206 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000) (analogizing transaction causation to reliance). Loss
causation was called "proximate cause." In re Daou Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 397 F.3d 704, 710 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that causation in § 10(b) cases "requires a showing of both actual cause
('transaction causation') and proximate cause ('loss causation')") (citation omitted); Emergent
Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (comparing
"loss causation to the tort law concept of proximate cause," and finding them similar);
Castellano, 257 F.3d at 186 ("While transaction causation is generally understood as reliance,
loss causation has often been described as proximate cause, meaning that the damages suffered by
plaintiff must be a foreseeable consequence of any misrepresentation or material omission."); EP
MedSystems, Inc. v. Echocath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 883 (3d Cir. 2000) ("In Semerenko, we
equated loss causation with proximate cause, stating that there must be a 'sufficient causal nexus
between the loss and the alleged misrepresentation."') (quoting Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223
F.3d 165, 184 (3d Cir. 2000)). Judge Posner has observed that "what securities lawyers call 'loss
causation' is the standard common law fraud rule" of proximate cause, "merely borrowed for use
in federal securities fraud cases." Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis in original) (Posner, J., for the court); accord Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare
Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating § 10(b) "loss causation" is "nothing more than
the 'standard common law fraud rule"') (citation omitted).
213. Coffee, supra note 106, at 544.
214. See, e.g., Estate of Lisle v. Comm'r, 341 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Here there is a
significant functional overlap of the two elements" of a Tax Court rule, "as the effort to prove
underpayment and fraud is sustained by much the same evidence-establishing a kickback
scheme to hide income proves both an underpayment and points toward fraud, on our facts.");
Walker v. Schwalbe, 112 F.3d 1127, 1132 (lth Cir. 1997) (discussing four-part First
Amendment retaliatory demotion claim, the court concluded that "reasonable inferences from the
same evidence" satisfied the third element and also satisfied the fourth element); Automated
Salvage Transp., Inc. v. NV Koninklijke KNP BT, 106 F. Supp. 2d 606, 623 (D.N.J. 1999) ("As
discussed below, the same material facts satisfy the first two elements-(1) material
misrepresentation which was (2) made knowingly.").
215. See Daou Sys., 397 F.3d at 711 (citing In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079,
1091 (9th Cir. 2002) for the proposition that falsity and scienter may be inferred from the same
allegations); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 685 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
nature of misrepresentations can create an inference of falsity and scienter); Adams v. Kinder-
Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003) (falsity and scienter may both be inferred
from allegations of GAAP violations); In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 744 (8th
Cir. 2002) (citing In re Vantive Corp., 283 F.3d at 1091); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d
Cir. 2000) (explaining that a sudden, large write-off creates an inference both that prior financial
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common-law claims, the precedents never suggest that they must
always be demonstrated separately. To the contrary, the primary focus
in the case law was on reliance, with proximate cause discussed only
occasionally and when plaintiffs sought recovery beyond direct out-of-
pocket loss and immediate consequential damages. Nor is there any
general requirement that the two be proved independently, let alone
with independent evidence.
Consider a garden-variety fraud, in which the seller of a car-last
year's model-put 85,000 miles on it in just one year of driving, but
turns the odometer back to 15,000 miles before placing it on the used-
car market. Now, who can doubt that turning the odometer back on a
late-model car, from 85,000 miles to just 15,000, amounts to a material
misrepresentation? That it is a misrepresentation made with scienter is
a reasonable inference-indeed, a strong one--for turning an odometer
back entails deliberate conduct, calculated to mislead. The fact that a
plaintiff purchased the car, paying something approximating the going
market rate for a car of that make, model, and (supposed) mileage,
raises a reasonable inference of reliance. For we all know that, at
common law, reliance may be inferred on the basis of a representation's
materiality combined with purchase of the car. 6  The purchaser's
reliance can easily be inferred from the fact that a car with high mileage
is of considerably less value than one with low mileage. Had the
plaintiff known the truth, he probably would not have purchased the
car---or, at least, not on the same terms. As it happens, then, the same
statements were false and that defendants were aware of the problem).
216. This is well-established, for "[t]he fact of reliance upon alleged false representations may
be inferred from circumstances attending the transaction, which often times afford much stronger
and more satisfactory evidence of the inducement which prompted the party defrauded to enter
into the contract than direct testimony to the same effect." 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit §
477 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see also id. § 500. The legal encyclopedias have long explained:
when it is shown that the representations were false and material, and were made
fraudulently, it is presumed that they were relied upon, and that the burden is upon the
party who made them to show that the other did not rely upon them. Again, it has been
held that when one has made a false representation which, from its nature, might
induce another to enter into [a] contract on the faith of it, it will be inferred that the
latter was induced thereby to contract, and it does not rest on him to show [by
independent evidence] that he, in fact, relied upon the representation.
24 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 264 (1939) (footnote omitted). It may be noted that common
law rules of evidence long prohibited testimony by the parties to the case. See, e.g., Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967) ("A party to a civil or criminal case was not allowed to testify
on his own behalf for fear that he might be tempted to lie."); 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6005, at 57 (1990) ("The common
law at one time disqualified from testifying all parties and others with any pecuniary or
proprietary interest in the outcome of a suit."). Thus, under common law rules of evidence,
reliance generally had to be inferred from a misrepresentation's materiality, coupled with conduct
consistent with reliance on the misrepresentation. 24 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 288 (1939).
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facts demonstrate the plaintiffs loss, which ordinarily would consist of
the difference between the price paid for what appeared to be a low-
mileage car, and the value received.
Given such an instance of garden-variety common-law fraud, no one
would object that a court improperly "conflated" materiality, scienter,
reliance (or "transaction causation") and proximate cause (or "loss
causation") by observing that the same facts tend to demonstrate them
all. Nor would many object if a court omitted an extended analysis of
proximate cause as an independent element if all the purchaser sought to
recover was out-of-pocket loss. In fact, proximate cause is seldom a
point of dispute in the precedents when the plaintiff seeks out-of-pocket
loss suffered as a consequence of fraud.
Proximate cause would come in to play, of course, if the plaintiff
sought more than that immediate loss. For example, if the car broke
down for reasons arguably related to high mileage, would the purchaser
recover the cost of repairs as foreseeable consequential damages? If the
car broke down as the purchaser drove his pregnant wife to the hospital,
would the seller face liability for resulting medical complications? And
so on. Obviously, proximate-cause concepts meaningfully cut off
potential liability.217 Surely, if the case did not go to trial until several
years after the automobile purchase, disclosure-market-drop adherents
would not insist that the "real cause" of plaintiffs loss should be
attributed not to the original fraud, but to a "general decline" in the
value of late-model cars, whose value materially falls for reasons
obviously unrelated to the original fraud-though that apparently would
be their contention in a securities case.
If in the typical market-fraud case, the same facts are apt to show
both loss causation and transaction causation, important conceptual
restrictions remain. In Basic, the Supreme Court emphasized that
"[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff,
or his decision to trade," i.e., transaction causation, can break the
217. The Dura opinion notes that, at least in the fraud-on-the-market context, an initial
purchaser has no economic loss at the moment of purchase because he may sell the inflated shares
"quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out." Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct.
1627, 1631 (2005). That same view recently got the Federal National Mortgage Association, or
"Fannie Mae," into hot water, resulting in Fannie Mae forfeiting $7.5 million to the federal
government. See Paul Muolo & Brian Collins, Fannie to Pay $7.5 MM in GNMA Fraud, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Dec. 20, 2004. Fannie Mae believed that a mortgage lender had sold it
fraudulent loans, but instead of informing regulators about the loans. Fannie Mae forced the
lender to buy them back-allegedly aware that the buyback was made possible only because the
lender passed on those same false loans to another purchaser. Id.
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causational chain required to prevail in a securities-fraud case. 218 Thus,
proof that the market price was not inflated because "the 'market
makers' were privy to the truth," or because inflation had been removed
prior to purchase by other means, would defeat a claim--even if the
plaintiff was individually misled and could show transaction
causation.21 9 Alternatively, a plaintiff who traded knowing that the price
was manipulated "could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a
price he knew had been manipulated., 220  Thus, loss causation and
transaction causation both remain critical elements even if in the typical
case they are intertwined, and proved by the same facts.
History shows that courts generally have had little trouble separating
out the two causation elements, and recognize that despite having
satisfactorily alleged transaction causation plaintiffs may not necessarily
have pleaded loss causation.2 1 In the Seventh Circuit Bastian case, for
example, plaintiffs invested $600,000 in a limited partnership in direct
222
reliance on defendants' false claim of business competence. 2 Within
three years the partnership was worthless, apparently due to declining
industry profits.223 Plaintiffs never alleged, despite amendment, that
defendants' misrepresentations inflated the securities' acquisition
price.224 They instead claimed it was sufficient that they invested in
reliance on defendants' fraud, and contended that they did not have to
show their loss was caused by the fraud. 225  Not surprisingly, the
Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contention and held that plaintiffs
must allege that the fraud caused their injury, noting that other ventures
in the industry survived despite declining profits. 226  If courts can
distinguish loss causation and transaction causation when the distinction
matters, there is little reason to adopt draconian formulations of loss
causation to defeat investors' claims in those cases where proof of
reliance and loss legitimately converge.
C. Judges and Juries Can be Trusted to Determine Complex Issues
A central premise underlying Professor Coffee's thesis that "losses"
218. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 249.
221. See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1990) ("They have
alleged the cause of their entering into the transaction in which they lost money but not the cause
of the transaction's turning out to be a losing one.").
222. Id. at 682.
223. Id. at 684.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 683.
226. Id. at 684.
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require a visible market reaction to disclosures is that judges and juries
cannot be trusted to sort out a misstatement's real financial impact.
227
This premise fails on several fronts.228
First, the charge that losses can be hard to determine could be leveled
in virtually every area of civil litigation that is more complicated than
the simplest tort action, but that fact does not keep judges and juries
from sorting out those complicated disputes.229 Even in personal-injury
cases, juries must consider medical evidence and expert opinion, and
may even have to place a dollar amount on lost future income and on
pain and suffering.2 0 Losses and damages in myriad contracts, patents,
or antitrust disputes are considered, weighed, and soundly decided every
day by juries and judges across this nation. 231 Securities-fraud cases are
surely not that different from the judgments and decisions that must be
made in these occasionally esoteric areas.
Second, both sides in large, expensive securities-fraud actions will
ordinarily have at their disposal experts of the highest caliber to test
each other, all willing to deconstruct for laypersons the intricacies of the
fraud and its effect upon the market.232 Expert economists and
227. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 106, at 533 ("The key problem.., involves the limited
institutional competence of judges and juries to infer losses."). See also id. at 538 ("Even if
judges and juries are competent ... they cannot reliably measure its financial impact.").
228. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
229. See, e.g., Synovus Trust Co., N.A. v. Honda Motor Co., 223 F.R.D. 699, 701 (M.D. Ga.
2004) (stating that "[i]ssues of negligence, product defect, contributory negligence, and damages
present unique facts that are particularly well suited for evaluation by members of the community
using their common experiences and wisdom.").
230. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 866-68 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming district
court's ruling that the jury properly evaluated the plaintiffs future medical expenses, disability,
and lost wages); Champion Home Builders v. Shumate, 388 F.2d 806, 810 (10th Cir. 1967)
(holding that the jury verdict awarding medical expenses, compensation for injuries, and residual
effects in personal injury case was not excessive).
231. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) The court
stated:
There is thus no warrant for limiting even complex patent litigation to an exclusive
professional ritual engaged in only by lawyers and judges. Elbowing to one side the
Seventh Amendment, and the compelling social and democratic (much less
constitutional) bases for its existence, would be at best an unseemly judicial exercise.
Id. See also Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing district
court's denial of jury trial in antitrust matter based upon a "complexity exception," where the
court was "confident that if such an exception exists, it is only to be applied when the trial judge
finds that the case is so complex that a jury could not render a rational decision based upon a
reasonable understanding of the evidence and applicable rules of law"); Radiation Dynamics, Inc.
v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1972) (rejecting appellant's contention that the trial
judge "totally failed to provide the jury with the basic tools it needed to understand the nature of a
claim arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... ").
232. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Particularly in complex
cases involving the securities industry, expert testimony may help a jury understand unfamiliar
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securities-law professors render opinions several dozens of times a year
in larger securities actions.233 Once hired, the experts can produce event
studies, time/value line charts, and regression analyses all designed to
help factfinders (either juries or judges) come to reasonable
conclusions.234 The practice is well established in the lower courts.235
Proffered skepticism about judges' and juries' abilities to handle
securities-fraud cases thus rings hollow.23 6 "The opponents of the use of
juries in complex civil cases generally assume that jurors are incapable
of understanding complicated matters. This argument unnecessarily and
improperly demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation. 2 37
V. CONCLUSION
Any insistence that "loss" cannot occur unless the full scope of a
securities fraud is publicly disclosed, with a corresponding visible
stock-price drop, is an artificial construct at odds both with precedent
and the realities of the modem marketplace. As still-unfolding events
have illustrated, sophisticated financial frauds take many forms and
shapes. The manner in which each fraud produces investors' losses
rarely fits into the cookie-cutter form that defendants and commentators
like Professor Coffee would employ--indeed, as the Supreme Court
explains, a "tangle of factors" affects a security's price. Moreover,
some of the major wrongdoers' culpability may not be definitively
unearthed until long after any vestige of inflation has been drained from
the corporation's stock price. But the happenstance of a final
disclosure's timing or magnitude does nothing to lessen the very real
terms and concepts.").
233. See, e.g., id. (upholding use of Professor Coffee's expert testimony in securities action).
234. On the use of expert analysis and event studies in calculating inflation resulting from
fraud while excluding other market variables, see Fischel, supra note 127, at 17-19, and Bradford
Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the
Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REv. 883, 897-911 (1990). See also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[F]act finder may rely on other methods of determining actual
value on the date of purchase, including expert testimony on actual value.").
235. Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2003) (declining to "attach
dispositive significance to the stock's price movements absent sufficient facts and expert
testimony, which cannot be considered at this procedural juncture"); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), affid in part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (in
securities cases, "amount of damages is a jury issue although the services of a special master or
the testimony of an expert witness ... may be particularly helpful") (footnotes omitted), affd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
236. See discussion supra, Part IV.C.
237. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Morgan v.
District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We traditionally trust juries to
make far more complex evaluations without the interposition of experts.").
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economic losses that innocent investors experience when, after
purchasing securities inflated by those wrongdoers' actions, relevant
truths enter the marketplace and remove the purchase-price inflation.
The Supreme Court has spoken, and refused to adopt the stringent
requirements argued by Dura or its amici.
